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Introduction
Metacognition allows reflection upon and control of other cogni-
tive processes such as perception, decision-making, and memory 
(Metcalfe and Shimamura, 1996). Efforts to quantify metacogni-
tion have focussed on how people judge their performance (sec-
ond-order judgements) in a variety of domains (Fleming and Lau, 
2014). For instance, in perceptual decision-making tasks, a first-
order discrimination is made about a stimulus (e.g. orientation of 
a grating), followed by a second-order assessment of confidence 
of whether the first-order discrimination is likely to be correct. 
Effective metacognitive monitoring is important for behavioural 
control, such as when one recognises a poor decision and pursues 
an alternative course of action. Accounting for deficits in meta-
cognitive function may shed light on the causes of a lack of 
insight into neuropsychiatric disorders and reveal possible diag-
nostic and therapeutic options which target metacognitive abnor-
malities (David et al., 2014; Koren et al., 2006).
Despite a central role for metacognition in the monitoring and 
control of behaviour, the relevant neurocognitive architecture 
supporting metacognition remains poorly understood. Initial neu-
ropsychological studies pointed to the importance of the frontal 
lobe in second-order judgements about memory performance 
(Janowsky et al., 1989; Shimamura and Squire, 1986), with 
selective deficits in metacognition observed in conditions such as 
Korsakoff’s syndrome associated with frontal atrophy. In paral-
lel, studies of performance monitoring identified neural signals 
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involved in error monitoring originating in posterior medial fron-
tal cortex (Dehaene et al., 1994; Gehring et al., 1993). Since the 
introduction of these seminal studies, a standard approach lever-
ages modern neuroimaging methods to identify neural correlates 
of metacognitive judgements across different tasks, primarily 
recognition memory (metamemory), and perceptual and value-
based decision-making (which we collectively refer to here as 
‘metadecision’). Such research has confirmed the involvement of 
a frontoparietal network in metacognition (Fleming and Dolan, 
2014) and begun to assign distinct computational roles to ele-
ments within this network (Bang and Fleming, 2018; Kepecs 
et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Miyamoto et al., 2018).
A complementary but hitherto distinct perspective on the 
brain basis for metacognition is provided by studies of theory of 
mind (ToM) – the capacity to understand others’ mental states 
and to appreciate that these may differ from our own. Carruthers’ 
interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory proposes that self-
directed metacognition relies on turning a specialised circuit for 
mindreading on ourselves, to indirectly infer our state of mind 
(Carruthers, 2009, 2011; Frith, 2012). This view is related to a 
recent proposal that confidence in our own actions is formed via 
a second-order evaluation of a coupled but distinct decision sys-
tem, computationally equivalent to inferring the performance of 
another actor (Fleming and Daw, 2017). Indirect evidence for this 
view has been found in developmental studies that reveal the 
ability to explicitly monitor self-performance (using confidence 
ratings) is gained at around the same age (4–5 years old) as chil-
dren begin to pass false-belief tests (Hembacher and Ghetti, 
2014; Lockl and Schneider, 2007). Neuroimaging studies of 
mentalising have also highlighted a frontoparietal network, with 
meta-analyses identifying anterior dorsal medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC), bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precu-
neus as key nodes (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 
1999; Molenberghs et al., 2016; Schurz et al., 2014). However, 
given that relatively less is known about the neural basis of meta-
cognition than ToM, whether metacognition and ToM (and men-
talising more specifically) share neural substrates remains an 
open question (Lombardo et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 2012; 
Valk et al., 2016).
When drawing inferences about the architecture of metacog-
nition from individual studies, it is important to consider the class 
of second-order judgement being elicited (Schwartz and Diaz, 
2014). Metacognitive judgements can be subdivided by both 
domain and temporal focus – retrospective or prospective 
(Fleming and Dolan, 2014). For instance, judgements of confi-
dence or monitoring for errors are retrospective judgements of 
performance, whereas prospective judgements (typically used in 
metamemory tasks) include ‘feelings of knowing’ (FOKs) and 
‘judgements of learning’ (JOLs) that refer to one’s future task 
performance. Lateral and medial aspects of prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) have been suggested to support retrospective and prospec-
tive judgements, respectively (Fleming and Dolan, 2014; Pannu 
et al., 2005). However, direct neuroimaging evidence for a dis-
tinction between different judgement types is surprisingly lim-
ited. In one of the few studies to directly compare activation 
related to retrospective confidence ratings and prospective FOKs, 
Chua et al. (2009) found that prospective judgements are associ-
ated with medial parietal and medial temporal lobe (MTL) acti-
vation, whereas retrospective judgements were related to inferior 
prefrontal activity. However, the same study also found that both 
forms of metamemory activated common regions of medial and 
lateral PFC, and mid-posterior areas of cingulate cortex, indicat-
ing differences may be of degree rather than of kind.
An interrelated question is whether metacognition relies on a 
common, domain-general resource that is recruited to evaluate 
performance across a variety of first-order tasks, or whether 
metacognition is supported by domain-specific components. 
Current behavioural evidence for a domain-general resource is 
mixed: some studies find that efficient metacognition in one task 
predicts good metacognition in another (Ais et al., 2016; Faivre 
et al., 2018; McCurdy et al., 2013; Schraw, 1996; Song et al., 
2011), whereas others argue for a separation between metacog-
nitive abilities (Baird et al., 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2017; 
Garfinkel et al., 2016; Morales et al., 2018; Kelemen et al., 
2000). Moreover, a correlation in behavioural measures does not 
necessarily mean they share the same (neural) resource, as even 
correlated metacognitive functions can be associated with dis-
tinct neurostructural profiles (Mccurdy et al., 2013; Rouault 
et al., in press). Recent neuroimaging studies have highlighted 
both domain-general and domain-specific neural substrates 
(Baird et al., 2013, 2015; Chiou et al., 2011; Fleming et al., 
2014; Morales et al., 2018; Valk et al., 2016), with metamemory 
broadly hypothesised to recruit parietal and midline prefrontal 
regions, while metadecision recruits frontal regions including 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and lateral anterior pre-
frontal cortex (aPFC; Baird et al., 2013). However, direct com-
parisons between domains remain rare.
In sum, the neurocognitive architecture of metacognition 
remains underdetermined, partly due to study-specific differ-
ences in task domain and type of metacognitive judgement under 
study. Now that neuroimaging studies of metacognition are more 
prevalent, we have an opportunity to characterise consistencies in 
neural substrates of metacognition identified across different 
studies and task domains. In this study, we used activation likeli-
hood estimation (ALE; Eickhoff et al., 2009) to perform meta-
analyses of the current neuroimaging literature on metacognition 
across the two most studied domains: decision-making and mem-
ory. We also sought to analyse distinctions between different 
aspects of metacognitive judgements (e.g. their level and sensi-
tivity to performance) and, within metamemory studies, their 
temporal focus (prospective vs retrospective). Our study thus 
builds on and extends a previous meta-analysis that focussed on 
retrospective confidence judgements about memory (White 
et al., 2014). Finally, we also compare the results of our meta-
analysis of self-directed metacognition to networks engaged dur-
ing mentalising about others.
Methods
Identifying candidate studies
Candidate studies for inclusion were initially identified from a 
PubMed search using the following string: (metacognition OR 
metamemory OR metacognitive OR ‘decision confidence’ OR 
‘memory confidence’ OR ‘feeling of knowing’ OR ‘judgment of 
learning’ OR ‘error awareness’ OR ‘tip of the tongue’) AND 
(MRI OR fMRI OR ‘magnetic resonance imaging’). This string 
returned 169 records on 25 March 2018. The following selection 
criteria were used to identify studies for further evaluation: (1) 
studies reported in peer-reviewed journals published in English; 
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(2) use of functional or structural MRI with associated behav-
ioural measurements; (3) the task involved a metacognitive 
judgement by the subject; (4) stereotactic three-dimensional (3D) 
coordinates were reported from whole-brain analyses; (5) the 
study reported a contrast that fell into at least one of our analysis 
categories of interest (judgement-related activation, confidence-
related activation or neural correlates of metacognitive sensitiv-
ity; refer section ‘Analysis’); and (6) the study includes data from 
healthy participants. Our meta-analysis differed from that of 
White et al. (2014) in which we required an explicit metacogni-
tive judgement from the subject (their ‘Type B’ studies), while 
excluding studies which solely manipulated environmental 
uncertainty (their ‘Type A’ category).
From studies that met these criteria, we further limited our 
cohort to the two most prevalent domains in the literature: meta-
cognition of decision-making (metadecision) and metacognition 
of memory (metamemory). Other less frequently studied tasks 
(i.e. metacognition of emotion) were excluded from analysis. Of 
these 169 initial results, 34 met our criteria. To ensure our search 
was comprehensive, we also consulted studies cited in review 
chapters from ‘The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition’ 
book (Fleming and Frith, 2014) and searched the following string 
on Google Scholar: (metacognition OR metacognitive OR ‘error 
awareness’ OR ‘feeling of knowing’ OR ‘memory confidence’ 
OR ‘decision confidence’ OR metamemory) AND (fMRI OR 
MRI). These two sources resulted in an additional 13 studies that 
met our criteria.
Final corpus
The final corpus of 47 studies included a total of 88 analysis con-
trasts, 739 activation foci, and 2215 participants (see Table S1 in 
Supplementary Materials for full details). The number of partici-
pants in each study ranged from 11 to 191 with a mean of 47.13. 
One of the included studies (Hester et al., 2009) reported data 
collected from patient populations, but only the results from the 
control group were included. Coordinates reported in Talairach 
space were converted to Montreal Neurological Institute coordi-
nates using the algorithm in the GingerALE software (Eickhoff 
et al., 2009).
Analysis
Activation-level estimation analyses were run using GingerALE 
(version 2.3.6) software (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012). The most 
recent instantiation of the ALE algorithm tests for clustering of 
peak foci from different experiments against an ALE null distri-
bution created by randomly redistributing the same number of 
foci throughout the brain volume. In a typical study, the same 
group of subjects will contribute data to multiple statistical con-
trasts, and consequently, the activation patterns produced by dif-
ferent contrasts do not constitute independent observations. We 
therefore organised reported foci according to subject group 
(rather than contrast) and used the modified ALE algorithm to 
address this issue, as recommended by Turkeltaub et al. (2012). 
All coordinate files used in the analysis are available for down-
load at https://github.com/metacoglab/VaccaroFleming.
Included activation foci were smoothed using a Gaussian 
kernel whose size depended on the sample size (larger samples 
result in a smaller smoothing kernel; Eickhoff et al., 2009, 
2012). Multiple-comparisons correction was applied at the clus-
ter level at a family-wise error-corrected threshold of p < .05, 
5000 permutations, and a cluster-forming threshold of p < .001 
uncorrected. The resulting statistical maps indicate areas of the 
brain where convergence between activation foci is greater than 
would be expected by chance (i.e. a null distribution of clusters). 
We followed similar methods to those used in other recent ALE 
studies (Garrison et al., 2013; Pollack and Ashby, 2018; 
Sokolowski et al., 2017). 3D statistical maps can be viewed at 
https://neurovault.org/collections/4238/.
Activations were labelled using a combination of group 
atlases and anatomical landmarks. For greater specificity in 
labelling clusters obtained within PFC, we also referenced coor-
dinates against the Oxford atlases included in the FMRIB 
Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson et al., 2012). These atlases are 
derived from studies using diffusion-tensor imaging to subdivide 
regions sharing common connectivity fingerprints, including 
dorsal and ventral PFC, cingulate cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Neubert et al., 2014, 2015; Sallet et al., 2013).
Classification of contrasts of interest
In addition to classifying activation foci by domain (metadeci-
sion and metamemory), we also subdivided contrasts by analysis 
type, collapsing across domains. We identified three common 
contrasts of interest (Chua et al., 2014). ‘Judgment-related activ-
ity’ refers to contrasts comparing the requirement for a metacog-
nitive judgement against a baseline or control condition. 
‘Parametric effect of confidence’ refers to contrasts identifying 
activations that scale with the metacognitive judgement, such as 
a negative/positive parametric effect of JOL or confidence rating. 
‘Metacognitive sensitivity’ refers to analyses identifying differ-
ences in the extent to which metacognitive judgements track 
objective task performance. Finally, for metamemory judge-
ments, we also divided judgements by temporal focus (prospec-
tive and retrospective), while collapsing over contrast type. The 
one exception to this tripartite classification of analyses was for 
studies using the ‘Error Awareness Task’ (Hester et al., 2005). In 
this task, subjects are asked to detect each time they make an 
error on a go/no-go task, which is typically only achieved around 
70% of the time. This feature of the task permits a contrast 
between ‘aware’ (reported) and ‘unaware’ (unreported) errors. 
We classified this contrast as both judgement and confidence 
related, as it reflects the deployment of a metacognitive judge-
ment and lowered confidence in performance.
We conducted eight distinct meta-analyses: (1) all metacogni-
tion-related activations, collapsing over both domain and analy-
sis type, (2) judgement-related activations, collapsing over 
domain, (3) parametric effects of confidence, collapsing over 
domain, (4) correlates of metacognitive sensitivity, collapsing 
over domain, (5) metamemory-related activations, collapsing 
over contrast type, (6) metadecision-related activations, collaps-
ing over contrast type, (7) prospective metamemory-related 
activations, collapsing over contrast type, and (8) retrospective 
metamemory-related activations, collapsing over contrast type.
Comparing metacognition and ToM
To compare metacognition-related activations in our de novo 
meta-analysis to those associated with ToM, we obtained the 
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‘reverse inference’ map associated with the term ‘mentalising’ 
from Neurosynth (www.neurosynth.org, accessed June 2018). 
Neurosynth uses text-mining combined with meta-analysis to 
generate a large database of mappings between neural and cogni-
tive states (Yarkoni et al., 2011). A reverse inference map dis-
plays brain regions that are preferentially related to mentalising 
over and above other terms in the database (i.e. that show a high 
posterior probability P(mentalising|activation)). The map is cor-
rected for multiple comparisons using a false discovery rate 
(FDR) approach at p < 0.01. We computed the overlap between 
the Neurosynth mentalising map and our composite map of 
metacognition-related activity to examine common and distinct 
regional engagement. Note that while both maps are corrected 
for multiple comparisons across the whole-brain volume, the 
numerical values and thresholds are not comparable, as they 
are obtained via different meta-analytic methods (ALE for 
metacognition and multilevel kernel density analysis (MKDA) 
for mentalising).
Results
Composite meta-analysis of metacognition-
related activity
Collapsing across all 47 studies (739 foci), eight significant 
clusters were identified: in posterior mPFC (paracingulate 
gyrus/dorsal ACC), left and right insula/inferior frontal gyrus, 
left and right dorsolateral PFC, ventromedial PFC, right ven-
tral striatum, and right dorsal precuneus (Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Notably, the activation in right dorsolateral PFC was more 
anterior (anterior border y = 56) than that on the left (anterior 
border y = 40).
Table 1. ALE meta-analysis of all metacognition-related activations (FWE cluster-level correction p < .05; cluster-defining threshold p < .001 
uncorrected, and 5000 permutations).
Cluster Peak coordinate (MNI) Volume 
(mm3)
Region Maximum 
ALE value
x y z
1 –2 30 38 5096 L/R posterior medial frontal cortex 0.0331
2 44 16 0 4424 R insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0398
3 –50 24 28 3656 L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0349
4 –36 28 –6 1432 L insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0318
5 28 50 26 1160 R anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0245
6 –2 44 –12 1152 L/R ventromedial prefrontal cortex 0.0275
7 12 –66 54 1112 R dorsal precuneus 0.0275
8 10 8 –2 952 R ventral striatum 0.0290
L: left; R: right; ALE: activation likelihood estimation; MNI: Montreal Neurological Institute.
Figure 1. ALE results for all studies on metacognition. Clusters are displayed in MNI standard space. Multiple-comparisons correction was applied at 
the cluster level at a family-wise error-corrected threshold of p < .05, 5000 permutations, and a cluster-defining threshold of p < .001 uncorrected.
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Meta-analysis of judgement-related activity
We next separated activation foci by contrast type. A common 
distinction in the metacognition literature is between activa-
tions related to the requirement for a metacognitive judgement 
(judgement-related activity vs baseline/control) and those 
tracking judgement level (e.g. parametric effect of confi-
dence). The analysis of judgement-related activity included 12 
studies (94 foci). This analysis did not yield consistent clus-
ters, perhaps reflecting a lack of power given that between 
17–20 experiments are typically considered necessary for a 
well-powered neuroimaging meta-analysis (Muller et al., 
2018). For completeness, in Supplementary Materials, we 
include an exploratory analysis of judgement-related effects at 
p < .001, uncorrected, minimum cluster size 200 mm3 (Table 
S2 and Figure S1).
Meta-analysis of parametric effects of 
confidence level
We next examined parametric contrasts for activations co-
varying positively or negatively with metacognitive ratings 
(e.g. the level of confidence or magnitude of JOL). This analy-
sis included 36 studies (606 foci). Nine significant clusters 
were identified: in posterior medial frontal cortex, left and 
right insula/inferior frontal gyrus, left dorsolateral PFC, ven-
tromedial PFC, right dorsal precuneus, left lateral parietal cor-
tex, and right ventral striatum (Table 2 and Figure 2).
Meta-analysis of metacognitive sensitivity
Our final contrast type related to metacognitive sensitivity – 
the extent to which confidence effectively tracks task perfor-
mance across trials. A high degree of metacognitive sensitivity 
is obtained when people ascribe high confidence to correct 
decisions, and low confidence to incorrect decisions. Because 
sensitivity is a property of multiple trials, it is typically ana-
lysed as a between-subjects variable.
A total of 11 studies in our corpus reported results pertain-
ing to metacognitive sensitivity (61 foci). With cluster-correc-
tion, this analysis did not yield any consistent clusters, again 
consistent with a lack of power due to a limited number of 
studies. For completeness, in Supplementary Materials, we 
include an exploratory analysis of sensitivity-related effects at 
p < .001, uncorrected, minimum cluster size 200 mm3 (Table 
S2 and Figure S1).
Composite meta-analysis of metadecision-
related activity
We next turned to the distinction between metacognition-related 
activations across domains (metadecision and metamemory) 
while collapsing over contrast type. For metadecision, we identi-
fied 20 studies (211 foci). Five clusters were found: one in right 
anterior dorsolateral PFC, two in posterior medial frontal cortex, 
and two in right insula/inferior frontal gyrus. In line with previ-
ous observations in the literature, we found that activations for 
metadecision were predominantly lateralised to the right hemi-
sphere (Fleming and Dolan, 2014; Schmitz et al., 2004) (Table 3 
and Figure 3).
Composite meta-analysis of metamemory-
related activity
Collapsing across contrast type, the ALE meta-analysis of 
metamemory included 30 studies (528 foci). Six significant 
clusters were identified: in left dorsolateral PFC, posterior 
mPFC (paracingulate gyrus), left and right insula/inferior 
frontal gyrus, and left and right parahippocampal gyrus (Table 
4 and Figure 3).
Meta-analysis comparing prospective and 
retrospective metamemory judgements
Within metamemory studies, we next examined possible differ-
ences in activation profile associated with prospective and retro-
spective metamemory judgements (Chua et al., 2009). Prospective 
judgements (such as JOLs or FOKs) included 14 studies with 232 
foci, and retrospective judgements (such as recognition confi-
dence) included 17 studies with 287 foci. The prospective analy-
sis yielded three clusters: in posterior mPFC, left dorsolateral 
Table 2. ALE meta-analysis of parametric confidence level–related activations (FWE cluster-level correction p < .05; cluster-defining threshold 
p < .001 uncorrected, and 5000 permutations).
Cluster Peak coordinate (MNI) Volume 
(mm3)
Region Maximum 
ALE value
x y z
1 0 20 38 4784 L/R posterior medial frontal cortex 0.0281
2 44 16 0 4480 R insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0397
3 –50 24 28 3832 L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0348
4 –2 44 –12 1576 L/R ventromedial prefrontal cortex 0.0275
5 –34 26 –4 1432 L insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0272
6 12 –66 54 1408 R dorsal precuneus 0.0273
7 10 8 –2 1200 R ventral striatum 0.0290
8 –42 –54 48 1008 L lateral parietal cortex 0.0196
9 –40 10 38 872 L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0248
L: left; R: right; ALE: activation likelihood estimation.
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PFC, and right insula. The retrospective analysis revealed three 
clusters: in bilateral parahippocampal cortex and left inferior 
frontal gyrus (Table 5 and Figure 4).
Comparing metacognition and ToM
Finally, we examined a potential overlap between metacognition- 
and ToM-related activations by comparing our composite meta-
cognition map (Figure 1) to a meta-analysis of ToM. ToM-related 
regions were obtained from the ‘reverse inference’ map for the 
term ‘mentalising’ in Neurosynth, which identifies regions that 
are preferentially associated with ToM over and above other 
terms in the database.
Figure 5 shows the two maps overlaid on the same cortical 
surface projection created using Surf Ice (https://www.nitrc.org 
/projects/surfice/). Activations for both metacognition and ToM 
were observed in mPFC and precuneus, with ToM activations 
tending to be anterior and ventral to metacognition-related acti-
vations. There was clear overlap between metacognition and 
ToM in vmPFC (cluster centre of mass (–3, 45, –12)) and a region 
of mid-dorsomedial PFC ((–4, 40, 34); Figure 5, bottom row). 
Unique activations for metacognition were observed in dorsolat-
eral PFC, insula, and lateral parietal cortex; unique activations 
for ToM were observed in TPJ and temporal pole.
Discussion
Deficits in metacognition – the ability to reflect on our cognitive 
processes – have clear and important consequences for functional 
capacity and quality of life, and are often found in psychiatric and 
neurological conditions (David et al., 2014; Koren et al., 2006). 
Metacognition has been considered a higher brain function that 
depends on the integrity of prefrontal and parietal association cor-
tex (Shimamura, 2000) and that is particularly well-developed in 
Table 3. ALE meta-analysis of metadecision-related activations (FWE cluster-level correction p < .05; cluster-defining threshold p < .001 
uncorrected, and 5000 permutations).
Cluster Peak coordinate (MNI) Volume 
(mm3)
Region Maximum 
ALE value
x y z
1 26 48 28 1336 R anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0186
2 6 38 42 1232 L/R posterior medial frontal cortex 0.0172
3 32 20 –12 1056 R insula 0.0174
4 2 20 38 832 L/R posterior medial frontal cortex 0.0217
5 44 14 0 800 R insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0196
L: left; R: right; ALE: activation likelihood estimation.
Figure 2. ALE results for parametric effects of confidence. Clusters are displayed in MNI standard space. Multiple-comparisons correction was 
applied at the cluster level at a family-wise error-corrected threshold of p < .05, 5000 permutations, and a cluster-defining threshold of p < .001 
uncorrected.
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Figure 3. ALE results for all studies on metamemory (red) and metadecision (green). Clusters are displayed in MNI standard space. Multiple-
comparisons correction was applied at the cluster level at a family-wise error-corrected threshold of p < .05, 5000 permutations, and a cluster-
defining threshold of p < .001 uncorrected.
Table 4. ALE meta-analysis of metamemory-related activations (FWE cluster-level correction p < .05; cluster-defining threshold p < .001 
uncorrected, and 5000 permutations).
Cluster Peak coordinate (MNI) Volume 
(mm3)
Region Maximum 
ALE value
x y z
1 –50 24 28 3656 L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0279
2 –2 28 36 2128 L/R posterior medial frontal cortex 0.0240
3 44 18 –2 2048 R insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0227
4 34 –28 –14 1376 R parahippocampal gyrus 0.0232
5 –36 26 –8 1224 L insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0245
6 –28 –38 –14 808 L parahippocampal gyrus 0.0217
L: left; R: right; ALE: activation likelihood estimation.
Table 5. ALE meta-analysis of prospective and retrospective metamemory-related activations (FWE cluster-level correction p < .05; cluster-defining 
threshold p < .001 uncorrected, 5000 permutations).
Cluster Peak coordinate (MNI) Volume 
(mm3)
Region Maximum 
ALE value
x y z
Prospective  
1 –2 28 36 2216 L/R posterior medial frontal cortex 0.0218
2 –50 24 28 2056 L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 0.0224
3 30 14 –20 1040 R insula/inferior frontal gyrus 0.0152
Retrospective  
1 34 –28 –16 1632 R parahippocampal gyrus 0.0185
2 –28 –38 –14 1400 L parahippocampal gyrus 0.0203
3 –42 22 18 784 L inferior frontal gyrus 0.0156
L: left; R: right; ALE: activation likelihood estimation.
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humans compared to other animals (Metcalfe, 2008). However, the 
underlying neurocognitive architecture supporting metacognitive 
abilities remains poorly understood. By comparing the neural basis 
of metacognition across different judgement types (e.g. prospec-
tive versus retrospective judgements of performance) and tasks 
(e.g. decision-making and memory), we aimed to provide insight 
into the types of neurocognitive architecture (e.g. domain-general 
or domain-specific) that support human metacognition. In turn, we 
hope progress on this issue will aid in understanding the aetiology 
of metacognitive deficits.
Here, we present a first meta-analysis of the current neuroim-
aging literature on explicit metacognitive judgements of perfor-
mance. We used quantitative ALE methods to synthesise findings 
from 47 structural or functional neuroimaging studies on meta-
cognition, divided into categories based on domains (metamem-
ory and metadecision), analysis type (judgement-related activity, 
parametric effect of confidence, and metacognitive sensitivity), 
and, for metamemory judgements, temporal focus (prospective 
and retrospective). We also compared our results on self-directed 
metacognition to those obtained in a previous meta-analysis of 
ToM, motivated by theoretical proposals that self-knowledge 
partly depends on co-opting machinery that originally evolved 
for mentalising about others (Carruthers, 2009, 2011; Fleming 
and Daw, 2017; Frith, 2012).
In a composite meta-analysis collapsing over both analysis 
type and domain, we found consistent involvement of a fron-
toparietal network. Previous reviews have highlighted the spe-
cific contribution of a network centred on medial/lateral aPFC 
in metacognition (Fleming and Dolan, 2014; Grimaldi et al., 
2015; Metcalfe and Schwartz, 2015). We found evidence in 
line with this view, with metacognition-related activations in 
posterior mPFC, ventromedial PFC and bilateral aPFC/ 
dorsolateral PFC. Notably, the lateral PFC activations were 
asymmetric: left lateral PFC was more posterior and corre-
sponded closely to area 44d from the atlas of Neubert et al. 
(2014); the right lateral PFC cluster was more anterior, corre-
sponding to Neubert et al.’s area 46. In addition to these pre-
frontal activations, we also observed the involvement of 
bilateral insula and dorsal precuneus. This is consistent with 
an emerging view that the parietal cortex, particularly precu-
neus, supports metacognition in concert with the PFC 
(Mccurdy et al., 2013; Simons et al., 2010). The insula, 
together with posterior mPFC has been implicated in error 
processing and error awareness (Bonini et al., 2014; Garavan 
et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2007; 
Ullsperger et al., 2010), and is a hub for interoception (Craig, 
2009), thought to be a key modulator of, or input to, metacog-
nitive appraisal (Allen et al., 2016; Stephan et al., 2016).
Subcomponents of metacognition
We next turn to the review results for each contrast type sepa-
rately. Previous studies have drawn a distinction between activa-
tions tracking the requirement for a metacognitive judgement 
relative to a baseline or control condition and those parametri-
cally tracking the level of the judgement (e.g. high vs low confi-
dence). For judgement-related activity, we did not find any 
consistent regions across the studies, likely due to this analysis 
being underpowered, given the relatively fewer studies reporting 
results for this contrast. In contrast, regions parametrically track-
ing confidence level were widespread and highlight a similar net-
work to that found in the composite analysis (posterior mPFC, 
bilateral insula, right dorsal precuneus, ventral striatum, left 
posterior dorsolateral PFC, and ventromedial PFC), suggesting 
parametric effects were a predominant driver of the overall pat-
tern. Parametric effects of confidence in ventromedial PFC are 
Figure 4. ALE results for contrasts of prospective metamemory (blue) and of retrospective metamemory (yellow). Clusters are displayed in MNI 
standard space. Multiple-comparisons correction was applied at the cluster level at a family-wise error-corrected threshold of p < .05, 5000 
permutations, and a cluster-defining threshold of p < .001 uncorrected.
Vaccaro and Fleming 9
consistent with recent findings that perigenual ACC tracks deter-
minants of subjective confidence arising from multiple sources 
during perceptual decision-making (Bang and Fleming, 2018). 
We note, however, that parametric relationships with confidence 
in this meta-analysis may be due to a particular brain region 
tracking variables such as response time or stimulus difficulty 
that themselves covary with confidence, and we are unable to 
rule out the contribution of these covariates to these results.
A key aspect of metacognition is the extent to which judge-
ments track objective performance, known as metacognitive 
sensitivity. Sensitivity is defined as the association between 
performance and confidence over multiple trials and is typically 
measured using individual-difference metrics such as area under 
the type 2 receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC2) or 
meta-d’ (Fleming and Lau, 2014). Measures of metacognitive 
sensitivity are affected by task performance (Galvin et al., 
2003; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012), making it important to con-
trol for differences in task performance either in the design of 
experiments (e.g. by using staircase procedures) or in analysis 
by computing metrics such as metacognitive efficiency 
(meta-d’/d’).
In the current meta-analysis, 9 of 11 studies reporting neural 
correlates of metacognitive sensitivity controlled for perfor-
mance either in the design of the experiment or in data analysis. 
Unfortunately, this small sample was likely underpowered for 
the purposes of the current meta-analysis (Muller et al., 2018), 
and no significant clusters were observed after correction for 
multiple comparisons. However, at uncorrected thresholds, we 
observed involvement of a right aPFC region that was not 
observed in the parametric confidence meta-analysis (Figure 
S1). This pattern may indicate that the aPFC plays a role down-
stream of confidence formation – instead of monitoring perfor-
mance, aPFC may contribute to updating a mapping between an 
internal feeling of confidence and the usage of confidence in 
communication or subsequent control of behaviour (Shekhar 
and Rahnev, 2018). However, further studies of the neural basis 
of metacognitive sensitivity (as opposed to confidence level 
per se) are required to test this hypothesis. The small number 
of studies reporting sensitivity analyses meant that we were 
also unable to establish potential domain-specific differences in 
the neural basis of metacognitive sensitivity, although recent 
studies have highlighted a specific contribution of precuneus to 
Figure 5. ALE results for all studies on metacognition (from Figure 1, hot colours) as compared to the Neurosynth reverse inference map for the 
term ‘mentalising’ (cool colours). Clusters are displayed in a 3D rendering of MNI standard space.
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metamemory sensitivity (Baird et al., 2013, 2015; Mccurdy 
et al., 2013; Ye et al., 2018).
Comparing metamemory and metadecision
We observed common regions in separate analyses of metam-
emory and metadecision tasks, including insula, lateral PFC, and 
posterior mPFC, suggesting common inputs may drive judge-
ments in both domains (Morales et al., 2018). This metamemory 
network is similar to that identified by White et al. (2014) in a 
meta-analysis of nine studies examining retrospective confidence 
judgements about memory. We also observed partially distinct 
networks engaged during metacognition of decision-making and 
memory tasks. Specific to the metamemory analysis were activa-
tions in left dorsolateral PFC and clusters in bilateral parahip-
pocampal cortex, whereas specific to metadecision was the 
involvement of right anterior dorso lateral PFC.
Temporal focus of metamemory judgements
When separating metamemory judgements by temporal focus, 
retrospective metamemory activated bilateral parahippocampal 
cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus, whereas prospective meta-
memory activated posterior mPFC, left dorsolateral PFC, and 
right insula. Observing parahippocampal cortex activation for 
retrospective metamemory and PFC activation for prospective 
metamemory is consistent with elements of both direct access 
and inferential accounts of how metacognitive judgements about 
memory are formed (Metcalfe and Dunlosky, 2008). On one 
hand, fMRI activation and single-unit responses in the MTL have 
been linked not only to objective recognition performance (Kao 
et al., 2005) but also memory confidence (Rutishauser et al., 
2015), and feelings of familiarity (Haskins et al., 2008; Henson 
et al., 2003; Montaldi et al., 2006), consistent with a first-order 
contribution of mnemonic representations to metacognitive 
judgement. In contrast, medial prefrontal activation covaries with 
JOLs independently of first-order performance (Kao et al., 2005) 
and PFC lesions impair JOL accuracy but not performance 
(Schnyer et al., 2004), potentially consistent with an inferential 
basis for prospective confidence.
Comparing metacognition and mentalising
An appealing model is that metacognition and ToM share a com-
mon computational basis that involves recursive inference about 
our own and others’ mental states. Neural processes supporting 
ToM are typically assessed by asking subjects to read stories that 
describe a character’s true or false beliefs while undergoing func-
tional brain imaging (Saxe et al., 2006). These studies have led to 
the identification of a network encompassing dorsomedial PFC, 
TPJ, and precuneus as involved in ToM (Amodio and Frith, 2006; 
Frith and Frith, 1999; Molenberghs et al., 2016; Schurz et al., 
2014). However, despite surface similarities in activation loca-
tion (e.g. precuneus), up until recently, the overlap between 
large-scale brain networks involved in metacognition and ToM 
has remained unclear. A notable exception is a study by Valk 
et al. (2016), who analysed individual differences in cortical 
thickness and white matter anisotropy related to metacognitive 
sensitivity on perceptual and higher-order cognitive tasks. It was 
found that medial prefrontal regions, in which cortical thickness 
predicted metacognitive ability, overlapped with those from neu-
roimaging meta-analyses of mentalising.
Here, we assess overlap between our composite meta-analysis 
of metacognition-related activations and a meta-analysis of men-
talising obtained from Neurosynth. While a similar midline net-
work was engaged in both cases, there was in fact minimal 
overlap between the maps in posterior mPFC and precuneus; 
instead, metacognition engaged more dorsal and posterior 
regions. However, overlap was observed in ventromedial and 
anterior dorsomedial PFC. vmPFC has been specifically associ-
ated with self-reflective processing (D’Argembeau et al., 2007; 
Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011), and its role in ToM tasks is thought 
to support a simulation of what oneself would do in another’s 
situation (Jenkins et al., 2008). Intriguingly, in contrast, anterior 
dorsomedial PFC has been suggested to support second-order 
representations of mental states, irrespective of whether they 
originate from self or other (Nicolle et al., 2012; Yoshida et al., 
2010). Unique activations for metacognition were observed in 
insula and lateral PFC, perhaps reflecting the specific contribu-
tion of interoception/error monitoring and the formation of con-
fidence estimates, respectively, during self-directed judgements. 
ToM, in contrast, was uniquely associated with activations in TPJ 
and temporal pole, consistent with previous findings that these 
regions are biased towards other-referential processing (Saxe 
et al., 2006).
These data may tentatively speak to the difference between 
conceptual and non-conceptual forms of metacognition (Arango-
Muñoz, 2011; Proust, 2013). It is plausible that a subset of the 
unique regions associated with metacognition here (e.g. posterior 
mPFC and insula) mediate non-conceptual, lower-level epis-
temic feelings of uncertainty. This perspective is consistent with 
these regions being found in our parametric confidence meta-
analysis activations (Figure 2). In contrast, mPFC may support a 
conceptual second-order representation of one’s own mental 
states (conscious elaboration of epistemic feelings) and, in doing 
so, co-opt similar neural machinery to that engaged when reflect-
ing on or inferring the mental states of others (Carruthers, 2009, 
2011; Lombardo et al., 2010). A strong test of this hypothesis 
would be to compare neural correlates of explicit and implicit 
measures of self-directed metacognition (Logan and Crump, 
2010) with activity engaged when mentalising about others. We 
would predict that only variation in explicit metacognitive judge-
ments would share commonalities with ToM. However, it is also 
likely that differences in content between typical ToM and meta-
cognition studies may drive the differences observed here (e.g. 
judging another person’s emotions or social intentions vs judging 
one’s own cognitive or decision processes). Further within-sub-
ject studies are needed with matched task domain/stimulus mate-
rials to draw strong conclusions about the relation between the 
neural substrates of self- and other-directed metacognition.
Implications of domain-specific differences 
in metacognition for neuropsychiatry
One implication of domain-specific neural correlates of metacog-
nition is that damage or disorder affecting these regions may help 
explain the various types of introspective deficits observed in 
neuropsychiatry (David et al., 2014). The level of insight into 
one’s symptoms in schizophrenia have been linked to metacogni-
tive ability over and above differences in executive function 
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(Gilleen et al., 2016), and previous studies of lack of insight have 
highlighted similar regions to those identified here, including 
mPFC (van der Meer et al., 2013), insula (Spalletta et al., 2014), 
inferior frontal gyrus (Orfei et al., 2012), and dorsolateral PFC 
(Shad, 2004). Individuals with addictions, and those in remission 
from addiction, have been found to have deficits in metacogni-
tion which were predicted by loss of structural integrity in mPFC 
(Moeller et al., 2016). Furthermore, change in mPFC function 
has been found to predict the severity and prognosis of addictions 
(Moeller and Goldstein, 2014).
Neurodegenerative disorders have also been known to bring 
about progressive anosognosia, or symptom unawareness 
(García-Cordero et al., 2016). Specifically, Alzheimer’s disease 
has been associated with metamemory deficits independent of 
memory deficits, with various studies finding both better and 
worse insight relative to performance (McGlynn and Kaszniak, 
1991; Moulin et al., 2003; Souchay, 2007). The parahippocampal 
cortex, found in our meta-analysis of retrospective metamemory, 
is known to be one of the earliest affected regions in the typical 
progression of Alzheimer’s, potentially consistent with behav-
ioural observations of metamemory deficits (Cosentino, 2014; 
Didic et al., 2011).
Analysis limitations
Our study represents a first attempt to consolidate and synthesise 
findings in the neuroimaging literature on metacognitive judge-
ments and is accompanied by several limitations. First, coordi-
nate-based meta-analyses inevitably sacrifice experimental 
control to allow aggregating over studies. We were unable to bal-
ance the types of tasks (e.g. visual and semantic) used most fre-
quently in different domains, and such imbalances may affect our 
results. For instance, metadecision studies are typically conducted 
using visual perceptual tasks, which may bias our results towards 
this modality. Related to this, most studies in our corpus only 
examined one particular domain. Because of this, and prominent 
differences between metamemory and metadecision tasks (i.e. 
stimulus type), it is not possible to estimate the extent to which 
differences between domains are related to differences in task. 
Inferences on parameteric confidence level–related activations 
are also limited by not incorporating the directionality (e.g. high 
>low confidence) of the contrast. Second, our analyses collapse 
across many different judgement types (e.g. FOKs, confidence 
ratings, and JOLs) that may affect our results if each judgement 
relies on different processes (Chua et al., 2009; Leonesio and 
Nelson, 1990; Metcalfe and Dunlosky, 2008). Notably, in metade-
cision, all judgements were retrospective, so we are unable to 
assess whether temporality may differentiate metacognitive 
judgements more generally, or only within metamemory judge-
ments. Finally, all contrasts in our study were univariate, whereas 
domain-specific differences in confidence-related activation have 
recently been associated with multivariate patterns of activation in 
PFC (Morales et al., 2018).
Conclusion
Despite metacognition occupying a central role in human cogni-
tion, the relevant neurocognitive architecture has remained 
underdetermined, partly due to study-specific differences in both 
domain and type of metacognitive judgement under study. We 
used quantitative ALE methods to synthesise findings from 47 
neuroimaging studies on metacognition, divided into categories 
based on the target of metacognitive evaluation (memory and 
decision-making), analysis type, and, for metamemory judge-
ments, temporal focus (prospective and retrospective). We find 
engagement of mPFC and lateral PFC, precuneus, and insula in 
tracking the level of confidence in self-performance of both deci-
sion-making and memory tasks, suggesting domain-general con-
tributions to metacognitive judgements. We find, however, 
preferential engagement of parahippocampal cortex in metam-
emory experiments and right anterior dorsolateral PFC in meta-
decision experiments. Finally, by comparing our results to 
comparable analyses of mentalising, we obtain evidence for com-
mon engagement of the ventromedial and anterior dorsomedial 
PFC in metacognition and mentalising, suggesting that these 
regions may support second-order representations for thinking 
about the thoughts of oneself and others.
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